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Haldi’s theory and findings are significant contributions, comparisons to the lim-
ited findings produced by proponents of these perspectives may be less germane
than she contends.  
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Campbell Craig has written a well-researched and cogently argued account
of the intellectual development of three twentieth-century realists, Reinhold
Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz. In the first place, this book suc-
ceeds where many academic works fail: Craig does not expect his readers to
know the character and history of twentieth-century realism. Instead, in the
process of contributing a fascinating new account of the effect that the prospect
of thermonuclear war had on the ideas of these three men, Craig also familiarizes
his readers with both the prehistory of modern realism and its ideational founda-
tions.
Craig argues that the prospect of a thermonuclear war forced these three
realists, all of whom began their careers claiming warfare between states is both
an inevitable and inescapable consequence either of human nature (Niebuhr and
Morgenthau) or of the anarchic structure of the international system (Waltz), into
an abandonment of their absolutist realist doctrine. As Craig writes in the pref-
ace, he proceeds “from the assumption that their most important ideas can be bet-
ter gleaned from what they wrote publicly than from their private correspon-
dence, from psychological analysis, or from an extensive treatment of their par-
ticular personal circumstance.” (p. xiii) This book is what he calls, rather mod-
estly, a “traditional history of ideas.” (p. xiii)  But, as a history of ideas, Craig
does more than merely chronicle the development and the change in the ideas of
these three men. Instead, he tries to show the internal dynamic that guided those
changes.
For instance, he shows Morgenthau’s evolution from the apparently amoral
contention that the “simple and universal lust for power . . . drove international
conflict” (p. 57) to his moral differentiation between the character of America’s
foreign policy during the Cold War and that of the Soviet Union. Thus, in his
later thought power politics is no longer a contest between “undifferentiated insa-
tiable hegemons” (p. 61), but between moral good and evil as represented by the
United States and the Soviet Union, respectively – a contest the United States
could only win if it engaged in the evil of power politics. Craig shows how
Niebuhr’s thought evolved in a similar manner.
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While the treatment of these first two thinkers is fascinating, both for the
depth of its insight and for the breadth of its understanding, Craig’s argument
about the internal dynamic guiding the evolution of their thought remains some-
what unclear.  In the first place, Craig attempts to unify all of these thinkers,
including Waltz, by showing that the terrifying prospect of thermonuclear war
forced them to abandon their realist understanding of inevitable engagement in
favor of the “glimmer” or the hope of a world state, or what he calls the “new
Leviathan.” For all of them, only by creating a world state could we avert the dis-
astrous consequences of the almost inevitable war that would occur between two
nuclear states. Whether or not they made this explicit, Craig persuasively argues
all three inched closer and closer to such a position. Following this logic, their
fundamental arguments changed in light of the prospect of thermonuclear war.
They all had been thorough-going realists who recognized that their realism was
inapplicable in a world where the stakes were now so much higher.
But, in his treatment of Niebuhr and Morgenthau one finds the presence of
a different, somewhat more nuanced, argument. According to this argument,
Niebuhr and Morgenthau were never thorough-going realists. Instead, as he says
at one point in describing Morgenthau, “theories are devised to serve normative
ends.” (p. 111) Instead, for them, realist theory served as a strong medicine to
shake the United States out of its utopian idealism regarding the character of the
rest of the world. Owing much to Nietzsche, Craig shows how these thinkers
emphasize the insatiable character of a state’s will, in much the way that
Nietzsche had shown the insatiable character of man’s will-to-power.
Their emphasis on this insatiable desire for expansion would, they hoped,
compel the United States to engage in the power politics they thought so neces-
sary for either its survival (Morgenthau) or the survival of civilization (Niebuhr).
But, precisely in this underlying hope, they betray an essential contradiction.
Their argument makes a universal claim about the nature of political states which
attempts to show that the “lust for power” (p. 56) is common to them all. They
claim to speak as scientists analyzing the nature of man; but the very reason they
choose this emphasis, to awaken America from its idealistic slumbers, betrays a
certain assumption about the superiority of the United States. Thus, they implic-
itly do differentiate between their state and other states. In fact, as their later writ-
ing affirms, they prefer the United States precisely because it is a more peaceful,
less war-like state than either the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. That is, it is a
state less inclined to pursue the very policies they hoped it would adopt. 
According to this argument, it would not make sense to say that
Morgenthau and  Waltz were forced to abandon their realism in light of ther-
monuclear war.  Instead, it makes much more sense to say that they embraced the
change wrought by the prospect of thermonuclear war. The prospect of ther-
monuclear war gave them a means to achieve the normative end that had always
informed their writing: world peace. Before, they thought world peace could
Winter 2004
172
only come with American strength in the face of non-peaceful enemies, a
strength that could only be possible if America were much more realistic about
the character of the world. Now, the prospect of thermonuclear war might fright-
en all enough to turn toward the world state that could best secure world peace. 
Accordingly, it is incorrect to write as Craig does that “Hans Morgenthau
and Reinhold Niebuhr each developed a political philosophy that aimed to under-
stand modern political nature and the depth of modern war.” (p. 115)  It would,
instead, be more correct to say that they developed a political philosophy that
they hoped would make man transcend modern war and modern political nature.
Given their underlying argument itself, perhaps it is not quite that surpris-
ing that a strong moralism informed both Niebuhr and Morgenthau. Unlike
Waltz, their realism does not start from an assumption about the rationality of
human beings in an anarchic world. Instead, it starts from an argument concern-
ing the irrational will-to-power of human beings and the expression of that lust
for domination through state aggression.
Such arguments, precisely in their quasi-Christian emphasis on the sinful-
ness of man, often betray a lingering hope that, if only he would recognize his
sin, man could also overcome it. As Craig nicely demonstrates, Waltz, unlike
Niebuhr and Morgenthau, begins not from some sinful violence to which man is
prone, but from a structural argument regarding the inevitable response of a
rational state in an anarchic world. For Waltz, the conflict between states is a
product not of the aggression of man, but a rational response to a world without
a higher power to insure that “defection” is punished. Describing Waltz’s ground-
breaking 1957 paper, Craig writes: “War recurs not because of a normative fault
in the behavior of people or nations, but because the structure of international
politics possesses no mechanism to prevent it.” (p. 127) For Waltz, unlike
Niebuhr and Morgenthau, war recurs despite the intentions of human beings. It
recurs for amoral reasons as states who seek their survival respond to a system
in which there is no higher power to ensure the cooperation of all. Just as
Rousseau’s stag hunter is “trapped within a system that forces him to act contrary
to the common good” and seize the hare for himself despite his initial attempt to
cooperate with other hunters, so too in the modern world, “the peaceful inten-
tions of individual leaders or particular states are always outweighed by the
structural forces that push nations toward war.” (p. 129) 
Craig nicely shows how this explicitly amoral scientific approach initially
allows Waltz to “solve” the problem of thermonuclear war. “Structural realism
offered international relations scholars the opportunity to become authentic
social scientists” and by doing so it also “offered scholars the opportunity to put
the vexing dilemma of thermonuclear war aside” precisely by requiring them, as
scientists, “to dismiss the moral problem of thermonuclear war from their field
of study.” (pp. 134-35)  Thus, in a sense, structural realism seemed to achieve
what Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s realism had attempted but failed to achieve: a
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scientific explanation for war between states.  In a manner similar to his treat-
ment of the earlier realists, Craig now traces Waltz’s “retreat from parsimony” in
the later stages of his academic career. He nicely demonstrates that “Waltz’s
advocacy of the bipolar system, together with his ominous critiques of alterna-
tives to it, reflected his normative interest in the perpetuation of peace between
the two superpowers.” (p. 155) Unlike an astrophysicist who “does not morally
care whether the orbits of Neptune and Pluto intersect or not . . . Waltz does
morally care whether bipolarity leads to a stable international order.” (p. 155)
Waltz could not maintain his scientific stance toward international events for the
whole of his career; in his writing, his abiding moral interest in peace won out
over the moral neutrality which he had claimed was so essential to the social sci-
entist. And, while Waltz draws back from his predecessors’ goal of a world state,
he does so primarily for normative reasons: “the political formation of a serious
world state is likely to unleash severe and sustained conflict among societies
eager to dominate – or avoid being dominated by – that state, leading to a kind
of ‘international’ civil war.” (p. 163) Craig attributes this change to the extent to
which “normative concerns influence a social science occupied with the question
of war and peace in a nuclear age.” (p. 155)  He concludes by claiming that all
three “gravitated toward the normative goal of great-power peace in the ther-
monuclear age” and “came to reconsider this philosophy [realism] in the face of
the overwhelming normative end of great-power nuclear peace.” (p. 165)  But his
argument seems also to have implied something somewhat different. Craig has
perceptively shown how all three “gravitated” toward a normative treatment of
international relations. But his argument has also implied that none of them were
ever as amoral as their initial scientific posture claimed. Thus, Waltz could have
maintained the same amoral posture toward thermonuclear war with which he
began his career. Unlike Morgenthau and Niebuhr, it was not a new development
which would have forced a reconsideration of his basic argument. But the under-
lying moral concerns that inevitably influence a social scientist, especially one
concerned with issues as grave as war and peace, won out over a pretense of neu-
trality toward the outcome of such questions. Thus, one need not include, as
Craig does, the clause “in a nuclear age.” Instead, the nuclear age only brought
to the surface the morality that inevitably informs any human being investigat-
ing questions of such fundamental moral importance as war and peace.  
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